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COMMENTS 
ANALYSIS OF THE NCAA RULE 
PROHIBITING A SCHOOL- OR 
CONFERENCE-OWNED TELEVISION 
NETWORK FROM TELEVISING HIGH 
SCHOOL SPORTS EVENTS 
BRANDON LEIBSOHN 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The latest trend in collegiate sports is the establishment of conference and 
university television networks.1  National Collegiate Athletic Association 
(NCAA) conferences have recognized the significant financial and publicity 
benefits they can gain from owning and operating their own television 
networks and from providing cost-effective programming on these networks.2  
In particular, the Big Ten Network acquired over 30 million subscribers after 
only one month of being on the air.3  Since its debut, the Big Ten Network has 
accrued over 42 million subscribers, reaching over one-third of the United 
States and allowing viewers to watch and enjoy conference sports events.4  In 
2011 alone, the Big Ten Network collected $242 million in revenues with 
$79.2 million in profits to be split among Big Ten schools.5 
The Pac-12 recently launched its own conference network after noting the 
Big Ten Network’s success.6  Last year, the Pac-12 began broadcasting on a 
 
  Brandon Leibsohn is a third-year law student at Marquette University Law School.  Upon 
graduation in May 2013, he will earn a Certificate in Sports Law from the National Sports Law 
Institute.  Brandon graduated from Hamilton College in 2010, where he earned a B.A. in Psychology.  
Brandon currently serves as a Comment Editor of the Marquette Sports Law Review. 
1.  See Joe Drape, Big Ten Network Alters Picture of College Athletics, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2010, at D1. 
2.  See id. 
3.  About Us, BTN, http://btn.com/about/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
4.  Drape, supra note 1. 
5.  Stu Durando, Big Ten Network Had Record Revenue in 2011, STLTODAY.COM (May 21, 
2012), http://www.stltoday.com/sports/college/illini/big-ten-network-revenue-grows-again/article_e0 
5a998c-a390-11e1-99b2-001a4bcf6878.html. 
6.  Seth Davis, Pac-12 Network Looking to Change College Sports Landscape, SI.COM (Aug. 
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national network and six regional networks covering each of its member 
schools.7  The University of Texas has also reached a $300 million partnership 
deal with ESPN to have its own network, the Longhorn Network.8  All of 
these networks provide around-the-clock coverage of their respective schools’ 
sports events.9  The significant ratings result from football and men’s 
basketball games; however, the spotlight the other sports receive is equally 
important for the conferences and schools because of the potential for 
increased fanfare and revenues in those sports.10 
One of the more interesting topics to emerge from the growth of these 
networks is the idea of covering high school sports events, particularly 
football.  When originally formed, the Longhorn Network intended to 
broadcast live high school games along with highlights of high school sports 
events.11  Controversy arose when Texas initiated this idea because other 
NCAA schools felt that Texas would gain an unfair advantage in recruiting.12  
In particular, Texas and other schools and conferences with their own network 
would be able to offer recruits the chance to spotlight their talents for the 
country to see even before they make it to college. 
With the emergence of the Longhorn Network and issues relating to 
showcasing high school games and events, the NCAA issued an interpretation 
on August 12, 2011, to essentially ban youth programming on school- and 
conference-owned networks.13  The interpretation states: 
The academic and membership affairs staff determined it is 
not permissible for an institution- or conference-branded 
network to broadcast (audio or video) programming involving 
prospective student-athletes. 
[References: NCAA Constitution 2.11 (the principle 
governing recruiting) and NCAA Bylaws 13.2.1 (general 
regulation), 13.4.3.1 (recruiting advertisements), 13.10.3 
(radio/TV show), 13.10.3.1 (announcer for broadcast of 
prospective student-athlete’s athletics contest), 13.10.3.2 
 
31, 2012), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2012/writers/seth_davis/08/30/Pac-12-Network/index.html. 
7.  Id. 
8.  Texas, ESPN Announce New Network, ESPN (Jan. 19, 2011), http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/ 
news/story?id=6037857 [hereinafter Texas]. 
9.  See Drape, supra note 1. 
10.  See id. 
11.  Texas, supra note 8. 
12.  Michael Hiestand, How Texas Is Steering College TV Sports, USA TODAY, Aug. 12, 2011, 
at 1A. 
13.  NCAA, STAFF INTERPRETATION: BROADCASTS OF YOUTH PROGRAMMING ON 
INSTITUTIONAL- OR CONFERENCE-BRANDED NETWORKS (2011) [hereinafter INTERPRETATION]. 
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(game broadcast/telecast), 13.15.1 (prohibited expenses) and 
13.15.1.2 (fundraising for high school athletics program)].14 
The NCAA’s interpretation banning youth programming has created a 
situation where conference- and school-owned networks are prevented from 
pursuing cost-effective broadcasting despite the fact that high school sports 
broadcasts are cheap to produce and televise.15  Although there has been no 
legal challenge to the interpretation as of yet, the purpose of this Comment is 
to present a hypothetical case that a conference- or school-owned network 
could bring to challenge the NCAA’s interpretation in an antitrust suit.  Part II 
details the need for universities and their conferences to capitalize on revenue-
producing sources such as high school content.  Part III describes the basics of 
antitrust law and how parties have tried to challenge the NCAA with antitrust 
suits in the past.  Part IV discusses the hypothetical framework a network 
could use in an antitrust suit against the NCAA for its interpretation that bans 
high school content.  Part V concludes. 
II.  ECONOMICS OF CONFERENCE- AND SCHOOL-OWNED TELEVISION 
NETWORKS 
The vast majority of NCAA school athletic departments fail to turn a 
profit.16  Given these economic shortfalls, television revenue is highly 
important.  Conferences and schools are creating television networks because 
of the significant financial and exposure benefits these networks can 
generate.17  However, these networks require more than conference or school 
sports events to provide quality programming at all times since games are not 
played at all hours of the day.  One potential option for fresh programming is 
televising high school sports events.18 
The growing appetite for televised high school broadcasts emerged during 
LeBron James’s senior year in high school.19  Of all households watching 
television during one of LeBron James’s high school games broadcast on 
ESPN2, nearly two percent of those households were watching James that 
 
14.  Id. 
15.  See Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., 658 F.3d 614, 617 (7th Cir. 2011). 
16.  Associated Press, NCAA Report: Economy Cuts into Sports, ESPN (Aug. 23, 2010), 
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5490686.  The exact number of athletic departments 
earning or losing money each year is a heavily debated topic, but it is clear that many schools do fail 
to earn a profit.  Id. 
17.  See Hiestand, supra note 12; Davis, supra note 6. 
18.  See Kevin P. Braig, A Game Plan to Conserve the Interscholastic Athletic Environment 
After LeBron James, 14 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 343, 346 (2004). 
19.  Id. 
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night.20  Since that broadcast, ESPN increased its high school sports coverage 
to include thirty-three high school football games in 2011.21  In 2012, during 
the high school football season opening weekend, ESPN broadcasted thirteen 
high school games.22  Likewise, Fox Sports recently struck a deal with Texas 
high schools to broadcast all ten of the championship games from the state.23  
These decisions are clearly being driven by television ratings, fan support, and 
cost-effectiveness because the networks do not have to pay high broadcast 
rights fees for the sports events.24 
When Texas announced its plan to show high school sports events on its 
Longhorn Network, the plan was met by significant criticism from other 
schools and the NCAA.25  On August 22, 2011, the NCAA hosted a 
broadcasting summit to discuss high school sports.26  Following the summit 
and a panel meeting at the NCAA Convention in January 2012, the NCAA 
reinforced its interpretation banning youth programming on conference- and 
school-owned networks.27  The NCAA’s interpretation refers to seven NCAA 
bylaws and one article in the NCAA Constitution.28  Each of the references 
relates to the principles of recruiting by schools, but none specifically refer to 
conference- or school-owned broadcast networks.  This interpretation 
negatively impacts the ability for these networks to utilize content as freely as 
they could in the open market, and thus, the NCAA has subjected itself to 
legal challenges such as antitrust claims. 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs that would have standing to bring such a suit 
against the NCAA would be a conference- or school-owned network desiring 
 
20.  Id. 
21.  Rick Cantu, TV Jumping as Audience Clamors for More Preps, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN 
(Tex.), Sept. 17, 2011, at C01. 
22.  Christopher Parish, ESPN HS Football Kickoff Schedule, ESPNHS (Aug. 20, 2012, 9:00 
AM), http://espn.go.com/blog/high-school/football/post/_/id/5919/schedule-released-for-third-annual-
espn-high-school-football-kickoff. 
23.  Cantu, supra note 21. 
24.  See id.; Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., 658 F.3d 614, 617 (7th Cir. 
2011).  For example, an ESPNU game of two high school powerhouse football teams in Indiana only 
cost ESPN $500 to gain rights to broadcast the game.  Cantu, supra note 21.  Central Texas teams 
appearing on the local KBVO affiliate did not receive any monetary compensation.  Id.  Further, the 
Wisconsin Interscholastic Athletic Association only charges $250 for a live stream of a football game 
for one camera and $1500 if more than one camera is used.  Wis. Interscholastic, 658 F.3d at 617. 
25.  Hiestand, supra note 12. 
26.  Michelle Hosick, NCAA Hosts Discussion About Youth-Sport Telecasts, NCAA (Aug. 22, 
2011), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/NCAA/Resources/Latest+News/2011/August/ 
NCAA+hosts+discussion+about+youth-sport+telecasts. 
27.  New-Age Battle: Haves vs. Have-Nots, NCAA (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.ncaa.com/news/ 
ncaa/article/2012-01-17/new-age-battle-haves-vs-have-nots. 
28.  INTERPRETATION, supra note 13. 
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to broadcast youth programming such as high school football games.  
Currently there are only four networks owned by a conference or school that 
could serve as potential plaintiffs: the Big Ten Network, the Pac-12 Network, 
the Longhorn Network, and BYU Television.29  When the issue of youth 
programming first was brought up last year, the Big Ten Network declared 
that it would “‘refrain from telecasting high school games for at least the next 
couple years.’”30  The Pac-12 Network and BYU Television have not issued 
stances on broadcasting youth programming, but they have not made any plans 
on their schedules to promote such content.31  That leaves the Longhorn 
Network as the only potential plaintiff who currently would like to utilize such 
content.32  It is clear that cheap programming enhances the bottom line for 
profits for networks and if the potential gains become large enough, it is 
possible that any of these networks or others that are created in the near future 
could look to use high school programming. 
III.  PRIOR APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO NCAA REGULATORY 
AUTHORITY 
Prior to a school- or conference-owned network challenging the NCAA on 
its denial of high school content, the network should examine the Sherman 
Antitrust Act to ensure that the network’s claim meets all of the antitrust 
criteria.33  The network must prove that the NCAA is engaging in concerted 
action that unreasonably restrains trade involving interstate commerce.34  In 
crafting its argument, the network should look at precedent established in key 
cases challenging the NCAA for antitrust violations. 
A.  Foundation of Antitrust Law 
Congress passed the Sherman Antitrust Act to ensure that marketplaces 
 
29.  See About Pac-12 Enterprises, PAC-12, http://pac-12.com/AboutPac-
12Enterprises/AboutPac-12Enterprises.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); About Us, supra note 3; Get 
BYUtv, BYUTV, http://byutv.org/getbyutv/ (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); About, LONGHORN 
NETWORK, http://espn.go.com/longhornnetwork/about (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
30.  Brian Bennett, Delaney: BTN Won’t Air High School Games, ESPN (July 28, 2011, 
6:55 PM), http://espn.go.com/blog/bigten/post/_/id/29739/delany-btn-wont-air-high-school-games 
(quoting league commissioner Jim Delaney). 
31.  See About Pac-12 Enterprises, supra note 29; Overview, BYUTV, http://www.byutv.org/ 
about (last visited Mar. 19, 2013). 
32.  Mike Finger & Brent Zwerneman, Longhorn Network Still Has High School Football 
in Its Plans, MYSA (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.mysanantonio.com/sports/college_sports/longhorns/ 
article/Longhorn-Network-still-has-high-school-football-2122892.php. 
33.  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
34.  See id. 
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are competitive and that consumers can benefit from open competition.35  
Specifically, § 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act states, “Every contract, 
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of 
trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal.”36  Courts look at three 
elements when analyzing this law. 
First, courts consider whether there is concerted action, such as an 
agreement made between parties who would otherwise be competitors.37  
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed that concerted action prevents 
competition from having independence in decision-making and pursuing 
activities in the marketplace.38  In the sports context, the case of American 
Needle, Inc. v. NFL illustrates how the aggregation of team intellectual 
property rights constitutes concerted action.39  In this case, the court concluded 
that each of the NFL teams were independently owned and operated and that 
each team could be considered an “‘independent center[] of decision[-
]making.’”40  The Court also found that pooling separately owned trademarks 
and granting licenses for their use removes the independent nature of decision-
making and impacts competition.41  The Supreme Court rejected National 
Football League Properties’ (NFLP) argument that it was a single entity 
because the teams each have their own individual interests and “separate, 
profit-maximizing entities.”42  Even though the NFLP was acting as the 
promoter of the trademarks and pursuing the common interests of the teams, 
cooperation is not a relevant factor when determining if there is concerted 
action.43  Without the agreement by the teams to combine their trademark 
licenses, each team would be able to make decisions on granting licenses of its 
trademarks.44  Thus, this case shows that concerted action can be proven if the 
actors in the marketplace would be free to make decisions and perform actions 
without an agreement to cooperate with their competitors.45 
Second, courts look at the reasonableness of the restraint and whether the 
 
35.  MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
PROBLEMS 238 (2d ed. 2009). 
36.  § 1. 
37.  See MITTEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 250. 
38.  Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2209 (2010). 
39.  See generally id. 
40.  Id. at 2213 (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769 
(1984)). 
41.  Id.  
42.  Id. 
43.  Id. at 2214. 
44.  Id. at 2214–15. 
45.  See id. 
LEIBSOHN FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/26/2013  3:50 PM 
2013] SCHOOL- OR CONFERENCE-OWNED NETWORK  441 
procompetitive justifications of the restraint outweigh potential 
anticompetitive effects.46  To determine the legality of potential antitrust 
violations under the reasonableness of the trade restraint element, courts utilize 
either the per se rule or rule of reason test.47  The per se rule presumes that an 
action is unreasonable because the action has clear anticompetitive effects.48  
An example of such a violation is price-fixing because, when competitors fix 
prices, they inhibit free and open competition and hurt consumers.49  
However, the court can choose not to apply the per se rule if the court 
determines that certain actions, which would otherwise be considered 
unreasonable, are necessary for the sustainability of the market.50  The court 
has this option because competition in some markets is dependent upon 
cooperation among competitors, who give up certain rights individually to 
make the overall product better for the consumers.51  For instance, the NCAA 
is composed of universities and schools around the country whose cooperation 
is necessary to ensure competitive balance within each sport and to establish 
uniformity in the rules and regulations each university must follow.52  These 
factors combine to enhance the public’s interest in college sports, meaning the 
per se rule application would undoubtedly harm consumers if used in such a 
context.53 
For cases involving sports law, most courts apply the rule of reason test to 
address whether an action violates the Sherman Antitrust Act.54  As shown in 
American Needle, when sports leagues require some cooperation to produce a 
quality product, such as scheduling games and setting rules to protect 
competitive balance, these justifications make the cooperation reasonable and 
necessary to ensure the league can actually exist.55  In utilizing the rule of 
reason test, courts make a fact-based determination on the actual 
anticompetitive effects of the restraint and balance those effects with the 
 
46.  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 97–98 (1984); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 
(10th Cir. 1998); see also , e.g., Sarah M. Konsky, Comment, An Antitrust Challenge to the NCAA 
Transfer Rules, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1581, 1588 (2003). 
47.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103–04. 
48.  Id. at 100. 
49.  See Konsky, supra note 46, at 1588. 
50.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100–01. 
51.  Id. 
52.  Id. at 101. 
53.  Id. at 117. 
54.  E.g., id.; Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir. 1998); Richard J Hunter, Jr. & 
Ann M. Mayo, Issues in Antitrust, the NCAA, and Sports Management, 10 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 69, 82 
(1999). 
55.  See Am. Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2216–17 (2010). 
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procompetitive benefits.56  In the current hypothetical case, the plaintiff, the 
network, has the burden to prove the existence of anticompetitive effects, 
while the defendant, the NCAA, has the burden to prove that its action has 
procompetitive benefits outweighing those anticompetitive effects.57 
The courts will assess and balance the anticompetitive and procompetitive 
effects.  One of the first steps courts will pursue is looking at the direct 
anticompetitive effects and comparing what a free market would look like if 
the restraints were to take effect.58  For example, courts examine whether the 
output of products and services decrease in conjunction with a price increase 
and if the market becomes unresponsive to consumer demand.59  Of primary 
concern is whether the courts will utilize a quick-look rule of reason or full-
blown rule of reason analysis.  The difference between the quick-look and full-
blown analysis is that the quick-look analysis does not need to examine market 
power because the anticompetitive effects are clear and obvious.60  If courts 
fail to find a direct effect on the competitiveness of the market, they assess the 
market power of the parties involved under the full-blown rule of reason 
analysis.61  Courts determine market power by examining the relevant product 
market and deciding whether a reasonable substitute could be implemented for 
the service or product that consumers would find as attractive.62  If a party has 
significant control over the market share and geographical area, courts are 
likely to declare an action as having an effect on the competitiveness of the 
market.63  Next, if the nature and quantity of the anticompetitive effects are 
significant, then the defending party must show legitimate procompetitive 
interests and justifications to overcome an antitrust challenge.64  If the 
defendant can show this, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to then 
demonstrate that the action is not the least restrictive alternative, meaning that 
the interests and objectives could be accomplished in another less harmful 
manner.65 
 
56.  See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113. 
57.  See id. 
58.  See id. 
59.  Claire E. Trunzo, Comment, Ancillary Restraints in a Competitive Global Economy: Does 
the Possibility Exist for an Ancillary Restriction to Be Reasonable in Light of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act?, 29 DUQ. L. REV. 291, 299 (1991). 
60.  Cal. Dental Ass'n v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999). 
61.  See Trunzo, supra note 59, at 299. 
62.  See id. 
63.  See id. 
64.  Konksy, supra note 46, at 1588. 
65.  Id.; see generally Renee Grewe, Antitrust Law and the Less Restrictive Alternatives 
Doctrine: A Case Study of Its Application in the Sports Context, 9 SPORTS LAW. J. 227 (2002).  
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Finally, courts determine if the party’s restraint on trade affects interstate 
commerce.66  The application of interstate commerce focuses on the effects of 
the restraint including the transportation, purchase, and sale of commodities 
across states.67  Contracts that make services available across multiple states 
such that there is a nationwide operation can constitute interstate commerce, 
particularly when the primary goal of the transaction is to earn profits across 
the country.68  The U.S. Supreme Court declared in the case of United States 
v. International Boxing Club of New York, Inc. that when sports leagues “make 
a substantial utilization of the channels of interstate trade and commerce” 
through actions like negotiating the sale of television rights across the country, 
then the sports league’s actions can be considered interstate commercial 
activity, especially if the significant portion of the overall revenue from the 
action arrives from these television rights.69 
Thus, a school- or conference-owned network could better argue its 
antitrust case by utilizing the arguments made in other antitrust suits and 
incorporating each of the three antitrust considerations in its claim. 
B.  Understanding Antitrust Law Through Seminal NCAA Case Law 
Over the past thirty years, the NCAA has been sued for numerous 
potential violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act.70  In each of the successful 
challenges, the plaintiffs have demonstrated that the NCAA unreasonably 
overstepped its authority in trying to create fair competition.71  The NCAA’s 
desire to regulate issues such as television broadcasting, uniform logos, 
coaching salaries and positions, and eligibility rules are all well-intentioned to 
protect the integrity and amateurism of collegiate sports.  However, when the 
impact of those NCAA rules exceeds the nature of their intentions or fails to 
achieve their intended goals in the least restrictive manner, then those rules are 
subject to being considered unreasonable restraints and violations of antitrust 
law.72 
The landmark decision in NCAA v. Board of Regents demonstrates that the 
NCAA is accountable for its rules and regulations.73  This case importantly 
 
66.  United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., Inc., 348 U.S. 236, 240–41 (1955). 
67.  See id. 
68.  See id. at 241. 
69.  See id., app. at 247. 
70.  See generally, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 
1010 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Hunter & Mayo, supra note 54, at 73–76. 
71.  See, e.g., Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117–20; Law, 134 F.3d at 1021–24. 
72.  See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117–20; Law, 134 F.3d at 1021–24. 
73.  See generally Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85. 
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determined that when the NCAA tried to restrict the number of televised 
broadcasts for its member schools, its rationale for supporting its restriction 
could not overcome the anticompetitive nature of the restriction.74  The 
NCAA’s plan restrained the price and output of collegiate football games 
because there was clear evidence of consumer demand for televised football 
games and additional money for schools to generate.75  Further, the NCAA’s 
market power was strong because football games were uniquely attractive to 
sponsors and advertisers providing television revenue.76  The Court dismissed 
the NCAA’s justifications of increasing attendance at games, creating equality 
in broadcasts per school, and maintaining competitive balance.77  Therefore, 
because the NCAA failed to meet its burden of providing procompetitive 
justifications for the restriction on the output of televised football games, the 
Court ruled that the NCAA violated antitrust law.78 
Based on the Board of Regents ruling, it is clear that in antitrust cases 
against the NCAA, courts must determine if the NCAA’s actions promote 
commercial interests or competitive interests for the benefit of its fans 
(consumers).  To ensure that a case can be brought forward, the cases of 
Adidas America, Inc. v. NCAA79 and Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball 
Ass’n v. NCAA80 highlight the need for a plaintiff to establish a marketplace 
where the NCAA’s actions have an adverse effect on competition.  Although 
Adidas was unable to plead and prove that there was a defined relevant market 
for the promotional rights of NCAA schools on athletic apparel,81 the 
Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball Association (formerly responsible for 
the National Invitation Tournament) overcame summary judgment because it 
defined the relevant market as amateur college basketball tournaments, where 
the market share of the NCAA’s March Madness tournament included over 
99% of television revenue from the postseason tournaments, thereby 
demonstrating that the NCAA controlled the market.82 The major factors in 
defining the market include looking at the fungibility of the product and the 
available substitutions.83  The Board of Regents case declared that there is a 
 
74.  See id. at 120. 
75.  Id. at 111. 
76.  Id.  
77.  Id. at 114–19. 
78.  Id. at 120. 
79.  64 F. Supp. 2d 1097 (D. Kan. 1999). 
80.  339 F. Supp. 2d 545 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
81.  Adidas, 64 F. Supp. 2d at 1102–03. 
82.  Metro. Intercollegiate, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 549–50. 
83.  See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 111–12. 
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separate market for college football broadcasts because there was no substitute 
for advertisers to reach their target audience or for fans to gain their desire for 
collegiate football on television.84  The fact that advertisers acknowledged that 
they would be willing to pay premium prices to reach these fans indicated that 
the product of college football broadcasts is itself a unique and separate 
market.85  These cases emphasize the importance of establishing that a true 
market exists before bringing forth an antitrust claim against the NCAA. 
Once a true market is established “or a horizontal agreement to fix prices” 
is shown, the NCAA is subject to scrutiny over its rules.86  The burden shifts 
to the NCAA to prove procompetitive justifications when there are 
anticompetitive effects in the marketplace.87  Anticompetitive effects occur 
when the freedom to operate in the marketplace is taken away from 
competitors.88  Thus, actions by the NCAA typically remove that freedom 
because the schools lose their ability to act independently in the market of 
college sports.  Of the few successful antitrust challenges to the NCAA’s 
rules, the Board of Regents and NCAA v. Law cases highlight how the typical 
procompetitive justification of competitive balance offered by the NCAA is 
not absolute.89  In particular, these cases show that the NCAA will advocate 
competitive balance.90  The courts acknowledge this goal as legitimate, but the 
NCAA’s rules must actually achieve competitive balance if they are to be 
upheld.91  In Board of Regents, the ban on televised broadcasts did not 
equalize the competitiveness of all schools because the ban did not cap 
spending by schools on their football teams or dictate how revenues from the 
teams were to be spent.92  In Law, the NCAA’s restriction on earnings and 
positions for college basketball staffs failed to protect competitive balance 
because more experienced coaches could still stay on the staff at the low 
salary, and the schools were not prohibited from spending the savings on other 
areas of their teams.93  Accordingly, the NCAA’s actions must actually 
maintain or improve competitive balance as opposed to merely putting a Band-
Aid on a small issue. 
 
84.  Id. 
85.  Id. 
86.  See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1020 (10th Cir. 1998). 
87.  Id. at 1020–21. 
88.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 106–07. 
89.  See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117–20; Law, 134 F.3d at 1023–24. 
90.  See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117–20; Law, 134 F.3d at 1023–24. 
91.  Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 117. 
92.  Id. at 117–19. 
93.  Law, 134 F.3d at 1024. 
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Additionally, the NCAA has asserted the preservation of amateurism as a 
main procompetitive interest.94  In Gaines v. NCAA, the NCAA’s rule 
prohibiting athletes who declared for the draft and hired an agent from 
regaining collegiate eligibility was upheld by the district court as necessary for 
the preservation of its amateur competition.95  According to the court, the 
protection of amateurism is not a derivative of promoting commercial 
interests.96  Rather, amateurism interests ensure that college football is not a 
professional sport and that student-athletes act in the interests of themselves, 
their fellow classmates, and schools.97  In reinforcing the draft eligibility rules, 
the court determined that the NCAA enhanced its product by protecting 
stability and integrity within its system.98 
Part IV of this Comment provides for a hypothetical framework that a 
school- or conference-owned television network could utilize in an antitrust 
suit against the NCAA, as well as addressing the likelihood of success of such 
a suit. 
IV.  ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF NCAA PROHIBITION AGAINST TELEVISING 
HIGH SCHOOL SPORTS 
Of primary concern for a conference- or school-owned television network 
is illustrating all of the antitrust requirements established in § 1 of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act.  First, the network must show that the NCAA is engaging in a 
concerted action by trying to control the network’s content.99  Second, the 
network must demonstrate that the NCAA’s action involves interstate 
commerce.100  Finally, the network must prove that the NCAA’s concerted 
action is unreasonable by showing anticompetitive effects and the NCAA’s 
market power.101  If the network can illustrate anticompetitive effects or show 
that the NCAA has significant market power over conference- and school-
owned television network content, then the NCAA will have to provide 
procompetitive justifications for its interpretation.  The networks will then 
have to establish that the NCAA’s ban on high school sports broadcasts is not 
the least restrictive alternative to achieve its goals.102  A final decision as to an 
 
94.  See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). 
95.  Id. at 741, 747–48. 
96.  Id. at 744. 
97.  Id. at 746. 
98.  Id. 
99.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
100.  See id. 
101.  See id. 
102.  See Konksy, supra note 46, at 1588. 
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antitrust violation will be decided by a jury.103  The procompetitive 
justifications that will enable the NCAA to prevail against an antitrust 
challenge by a conference- or school-owned network are promoting 
amateurism, maintaining competitive balance, and emphasizing academics 
over athletics. 
A.  NCAA Concerted Action 
To challenge the NCAA on its interpretation banning high school sports 
programming being broadcast, a conference- or school-owned network must 
show concerted action taken by the NCAA that unreasonably restrains trade 
affecting the network.104  The network could argue that the NCAA has 
engaged in concerted action to ban high school sports broadcasts on 
conference- and school-owned networks because the NCAA’s rule is a product 
of an agreement by the member schools allowing the NCAA to act as a body 
representing member schools that would otherwise be competitors.105  Thus, 
the network would be able to show the NCAA’s ban on such content 
eliminates what its member schools could do if able to make their own rules. 
B.  Interstate Commerce 
The easiest portion of the antitrust lawsuit the network would need to 
prove is that the NCAA’s restriction of youth programming broadcasts 
involves interstate commerce.  Provided that the network is available for 
broadcast in multiple states,106 which is the case for all current conference- 
and school-owned networks, then the revenues generated by the network 
would come across state lines.  For example, the network could show that 
since it is broadcast on major television providers such as AT&T U-Verse, 
DIRECTV, Dish Network, Time Warner, and Verizon FiOS, where it collects 
carriage fees from consumers in different states, the commercial aspect of its 
network impacts those states in which its network is available.  
Fundamentally, if consumers from around the country are paying for cable and 
the network is available through their television provider, then the network is 
receiving its revenue through interstate commerce.  Therefore, the network’s 
main concern would move towards the unreasonableness of the NCAA’s 
 
103.  Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 33 (2008). 
104.  MITTEN ET AL., supra note 35, at 238. 
105.  See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 98–99 (1984); MITTEN ET AL., supra note 35, 
at 250. 
106.  About Us, supra note 3; Davis, supra note 6; Get BYUtv, supra note 29; Ben Kercheval, 
LHN Officially Adds AT&T U-Verse to Carriers, NBC SPORTS (Sept. 1, 2012), 
http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2012/09/01/lhn-officially-adds-att-u-verse-to-carriers/. 
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restriction of high school sports broadcasts. 
C.  Per Se Rule Analysis 
To determine unreasonableness, courts decide whether to employ the per 
se or rule of reason analysis.107  As described in Board of Regents, the NCAA 
will generally not be held to the per se standard.108  To ensure competitive 
balance among the NCAA’s schools, the NCAA needs to make some 
horizontal restraints that would otherwise be considered illegal under the 
Sherman Antitrust Act.109  To challenge such a notion, a network would have 
to show that the NCAA’s interpretation, which bans broadcasting of high 
school sports events, is a clear restraint on the network’s market, especially in 
light of the fact that there are no current NCAA bylaws that specifically detail 
the nature of conference- and school-owned networks.  Yet, it is very likely 
that the NCAA could overcome this argument, primarily based on its need to 
protect competitive balance, but also on its mission to protect amateurism of 
its sports.110 
D.  Rule of Reason Analysis: Unreasonable Restraint and Market Power 
Consequently, the network should be prepared to argue under the rule of 
reason test for the NCAA’s potential violation of antitrust law.  The network 
must establish that the NCAA’s interpretation banning high school broadcasts 
produces anticompetitive effects in the marketplace.  By restricting output of 
high school sports broadcasts and reducing revenue streams for the network, 
the network could demonstrate the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s ban 
on high school content, which would be sufficient to justify the quick-look 
rule of reason analysis.  However, if the court chooses to use the full-blown 
rule of reason analysis, then the network would need to show that the NCAA 
has market power over televised high school sports events because of its 
control over revenue streams for its member schools and conferences.  Yet, the 
network should be aware that the NCAA is likely to prevail against these 
anticompetitive effects and market power arguments because of its 
procompetitive justifications for protecting amateurism, competitive balance, 
and the value of education. 
 
107.  See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103–04. 
108.  See id. at 100–01. 
109.  See id. 
110.  See id. at 117, 120; see also Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023–24 (10th Cir. 1998); 
Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 743, 747–48 (M.D. Tenn. 1990). 
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1.  Anticompetitive Effects 
The court could utilize the quick-look or full-blown rule of reason analysis 
in determining that the NCAA’s interpretation prohibiting high school sports 
broadcasts is clearly anticompetitive.111  Regardless, first the network must 
show that the anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s action prevent high 
school sports events from being broadcast on school- or conference-owned 
networks.112  It is clear that such a ban restricts output of televised high school 
sports events.  Although the NCAA is not responsible for ensuring that such 
content can be broadcast, the network could show that the ban on the youth 
programming negatively impacts the market.  To make such a claim, the 
network would need to conduct a study or survey sports fans and television 
viewers to see the effect that high school programming would have on their 
desire and commitment to watch the conference- or school-owned network if 
the high school sports events were available.  This type of study would 
undoubtedly be expensive and time-consuming but nonetheless would provide 
one of the most accurate pieces of evidence.  This data could show that the 
NCAA’s interpretation prevents the network from meeting consumer demand, 
which is more high school sports events on television. 
The network should also show that the anticompetitive effect of the 
NCAA’s ban inhibits the network from generating more revenue for cash-
deprived schools and inflicts commercial restraints such as those seen in 
Law.113  With the rising costs associated with sports programming, high 
school sports present a great opportunity for a network to draw in significant 
audiences while spending minimally to gain such viewership.114  If no ban 
were in place, the network could contract with high schools to increase ratings 
and advertising revenue at a minimal cost.115  As the NCAA has clearly shown 
through its own deal with CBS and Time Warner, maximizing revenue from 
television deals is vital for collegiate athletics.116 
Accordingly, the court could decide that the anticompetitive effects are so 
obvious that an assessment of market power is not necessary based on the 
 
111.  See Law, 134 F.3d at 1020. 
112.  See Konsky, supra note 46, at 1588. 
113.  See Law, 134 F.3d at 1020–21, 1024. 
114.  See Wis. Interscholastic Athletic Ass’n v. Gannett Co., 658 F.3d 614, 617 (7th Cir. 2011); 
Braig, supra note 18, at 346–47; Cantu, supra note 21. 
115.  See Wis. Interscholastic, 658 F.3d at 617; Braig, supra note 18, at 346–47; Cantu, supra 
note 21. 
116.  See CBS Sports, Turner Broadcasting, NCAA Reach 14-Year Agreement, NCAA (Apr. 22, 
2010), http://www.ncaa.com/news/basketball-men/2010-04-21/cbs-sports-turner-broadcasting-ncaa-re 
ach-14-year-agreement. 
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quick-look rule of reason analysis.  However, it is unlikely that the network 
would engage in the necessary steps to ensure that the anticompetitive effects 
justify the quick-look analysis.  Demonstrating consumer demand for the high 
school sports events inevitably would be a costly and time-consuming 
endeavor.  Further, the network would need to show actual deals that it could 
strike with high school athletic associations to broadcast the events if 
permitted by the NCAA to prove the cost-effectiveness and savings from the 
programming.  Thus, the amount of work that would need to go into 
establishing clear anticompetitive effects would entail research and 
negotiations that the networks might not be able or willing to undergo.  If the 
network were able to spend the necessary resources, then the court would 
likely shift the burden onto the NCAA to justify the procompetitive effects of 
its ban.117 
2.  Full-Blown Rule of Reason Analysis: Market Power 
If a court determines that the quick-look rule of reason analysis is 
inappropriate in the case, then the court would apply the full-blown rule of 
reason analysis and require the network to also show that the NCAA has 
significant control of the market power of televised high school sports 
events.118  The network would need to prove that a market for televised high 
school sports events exists and that the NCAA is inhibiting the network’s 
position in such a market in accordance with the Adidas case.119  The Adidas 
court stated that the market depends on the “‘interchangeability of use or the 
cross-elasticity of demand’” of the products.120  Further, the network has to 
show that the NCAA’s interpretation regulates and has an effect on the 
market.121 
In addressing the relevant product market, the network would have to 
show that there is no interchangeability or cross-elasticity of demand between 
televised high school sports events and other sports broadcasts.  The network 
would need to prove that there is no reasonable substitute for the televised 
high school sports events, which it could do if it showed that the high school 
sports events such as football are played primarily during the week while other 
amateur sports such as college football are played mostly on the weekend and 
that the other broadcasters of high school sports are unable to meet the 
 
117.  See Law, 134 F.3d at 1020–21. 
118.  See id. 
119.  See Adidas Am., Inc. v. NCAA, 64 F. Supp. 2d 1097, 1101–04 (D. Kan. 1999). 
120.  Id. at 1102 (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962)). 
121.  See id. at 1104. 
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demand, which the conference- and school-owned networks would be able to 
accomplish.  Further, given that major sports broadcasters like ESPN and Fox 
Sports have struck deals to broadcast high school sports events, there appears 
to be a set of fans and consumers desiring to watch who would otherwise 
spend their time in some other activity.122 
Next, the network would have to show that the NCAA interpretation has 
an effect on televised high school sports events.  The network would have to 
show that the NCAA, the governing body of collegiate sports, is attempting to 
control the market by removing a significant portion of the televised high 
school sports event broadcasters, conference- and school-owned networks.  If 
the NCAA is permitted to control the television content that conference- and 
school-owned networks can broadcast, then its effect on the market for 
televised high school sports events will be significant because it will limit the 
availability of high school sports event telecasts to other broadcasters that have 
not met the demand for the market.  Assuming the conference- or school-
owned network can prove that there is an additional desire for more high 
school sports events than already on television, it could also show potential 
damages in the form of lost revenues by showing the success of the Big Ten 
Network123 and the new billion-dollar deals collegiate conferences have struck 
with entities such as ESPN and Fox Sports.124  Thus, provided that the 
network establishes the NCAA’s effect on televised high school sports events, 
then the NCAA would have to show legitimate interests and justifications for 
the imbalance it created.125 
3.  NCAA’s Procompetitive Effects 
After the court has determined whether a quick-look or full-blown rule of 
reason analysis is necessary, the NCAA must meet its burden of providing the 
procompetitive rationales regarding its ban on high school sports events.126 
The main procompetitive justification that the NCAA has described in its 
interpretation, and that it is likely to offer in this case, is competitive balance.  
The NCAA would likely point out that allowing high school broadcasts would 
create a competitive disadvantage to conferences and schools unable to form 
their own television networks in recruiting these high school athletes and 
providing cost-effective programming.  While the network could argue that it 
 
122.  Braig, supra note 18, at 346–47; Cantu, supra note 21; Parish, supra note 22. 
123.  Drape, supra note 1. 
124.  Diane Pucin, Pac-12 Will Feast on New Television Deal, L.A. TIMES, May 4, 2011, at C1; 
Pete Thamel, TV Deal May Help Secure the Big 12, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 2011, at B11. 
125.  See Konsky, supra note 46, at 1588. 
126.  See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1021 (10th Cir. 1998). 
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opens up exposure to these recruits, the star players who drive the specific 
games to be televised would be inherently more attracted to the network 
showcasing them because of the publicity they can gain from television 
exposure.  Further, it is clear that schools such as Texas have the fanfare to 
generate their own television network,127 but for most Division I schools, it 
would be much harder to establish such a network.  Thus, unless every 
conference or school had such a network, the access to the athletes and the 
revenue produced from broadcasting their games would provide significant 
competitive advantages to the schools and conferences with their own 
networks. 
Another potential procompetitive justification is the same one the NCAA 
offered in Gaines: preserving amateurism.128  The NCAA prides itself on 
maintaining the amateur nature of its sports events.129  The potential problems 
involved with high school athletes being showcased on networks could make it 
even easier for schools and boosters to try to gain recruiting edges by knowing 
which athletes to target and offer illegal inducements to because the level of 
access and knowledge of recruits would increase.  These inducements could 
come in the form of monetary payments, gifts, or other benefits, which would 
turn the high school athletes into professionals being compensated for their 
athletic abilities.  Clearly the NCAA wants to maintain amateurism of its 
athletes, and it believes that prospective recruits should not be given special 
exposure as demonstrated by its bylaws 13.4.3.1, 13.10.3, and 13.15.1.2, 
which prohibit advertisements, interviewing or showing highlights of the 
recruit during a broadcast of the university’s game or coach-sponsored 
program, and fundraising for high school teams.130 
4.  NCAA’s Actions as Least Restrictive Alternative 
After the NCAA offers its procompetitive justifications of competitive 
balance and the preservation of amateurism, the burden of proof then shifts 
back to the network to show that the interpretation the NCAA set forth is not 
the least restrictive means for accomplishing the NCAA’s goals.131  It is 
unlikely that the network would be able to overcome the NCAA’s need to 
protect competitive balance and, to a lesser degree, to preserve of amateurism.  
Specifically, the NCAA’s interpretation prohibits televised high school sports 
 
127.  See Texas, supra note 8. 
128.  See Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 744 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 13. 
129.  See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 88 (1984). 
130.  2011–2012 NCAA DIVISION I MANUAL §§ 13.4.3.1, 13.10.3, 13.15.1.2. 
131.  Law, 134 F.3d at 1019. 
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events outright instead of some restrictions because the schools and 
conferences without their own networks would not be subjected to the 
recruiting disadvantages associated with broadcasting high school sports 
events.  A restriction that the NCAA could place would be to prevent the 
network from broadcasting games with athletes that the school or schools in 
the conference are recruiting, but then the concern would be how to regulate it 
if athletes shine in their telecasts and the schools then want to pursue them.  
The network would have a better case if each conference, school, or both had 
its own network because then the recruiting disadvantages would be 
minimized to a degree.  However, with only four true networks currently 
established, the NCAA’s ban appears appropriate.  Further, the network could 
potentially utilize other cheap programming, such as debate shows or 
symposiums of the coaches in the conference or school on topics of interest in 
college sports, in lieu of the high school sports without compromising 
competitive balance.  Thus, the network would have a hard time establishing 
that the NCAA’s outright prohibition is not necessary to protect competitive 
balance. 
5.  Jury Determination 
The final determination would be made by the jury.  The jury would weigh 
the anticompetitive effects with the procompetitive justifications offered by 
the NCAA and take into consideration if the network has shown that the 
NCAA’s ban on high school sports is not the least restrictive means of 
protecting competitive balance and amateurism.132  After careful 
consideration, it is likely that the NCAA would prevail and show that it has 
not violated antitrust law in its interpretation.  While there may be 
anticompetitive effects of reducing the availability of televised high school 
sports events and preventing the network from utilizing cheap and popular 
programming, the NCAA itself does not profit monetarily from its position.  
The NCAA interpretation does have an impact on the market for televised 
high school sports events, but the significance of the impact would have to be 
proven by the network.  The amount of resources the network would need to 
expend to prove the impact would be costly and time-consuming, and thus, it 
would be unlikely that the network would have enough evidence to 
demonstrate the impact.  Assuming the network could prove the impact, then 
the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications of competitive balance and 
preservation of amateurism would likely hold considerable weight in the 
minds of the jury.  Without an outright ban, the NCAA would be unable to 
 
132.  See Crane, supra note 103, at 33. 
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protect the competitive balance of schools and conferences without networks 
to broadcast the high school sports or, to a lesser degree, weed out the negative 
influences and illegal inducements of those athletes spotlighted on the 
telecasts.  Accordingly, the jury would likely find in favor of the NCAA. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In prohibiting high school sports events from being broadcast on school- 
and conference-owned networks, the NCAA has subjected itself to a potential 
antitrust violation.  Given that the NCAA has an effect on the televised high 
school sports events market and the networks would be able to produce cost-
effective programming, the NCAA’s procompetitive justifications of 
competitive balance and the preservation of amateurism must be accomplished 
in the least restrictive manner possible.  Although it is likely that a court will 
give the NCAA strong discretion in implementing rules and regulations to 
achieve these goals, the NCAA should clearly define what can and cannot be 
done in regard to high school sports being broadcast on the networks in its 
bylaws and constitution. 
After analyzing the NCAA’s ban on high school sports through the 
hypothetical suit described in Part IV, it is clear that the NCAA must address 
the issues of conference- and school- owned television networks.  Although 
the NCAA’s interpretation lists certain bylaws already in place for the 
recruitment of student-athletes, there is no set of rules specifically set for 
school- and conference-owned networks.  Even though the NCAA has 
attempted to quash the issue surrounding high school sports broadcasts, it is 
still vulnerable to an antitrust violation because of its outright ban in this and 
other future instances where the NCAA tries to control such programming.  
The NCAA must continue to host broadcasting summits like it did in August 
2011 and must prepare itself to legitimately create rules and regulations on 
what can and cannot be done on such networks.  Therefore, while the NCAA 
may be able to skirt past antitrust violations in this instance, it would behoove 
the NCAA to make sure it can effectively combat such a claim if it does arise 
in the future by implementing clear rules and standards for conference- and 
school-owned television network content that have appropriate procompetitive 
justifications surrounding them. 
